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The Mid-Atlantic Ethics Committee 
Newsletter is a publication of the 
Maryland Health Care Ethics 
Committee Network, an initiative of 
the University of Maryland Francis 
King Carey School of Law’s Law & 
Health Care Program. The Newsletter 
combines educational articles with 
timely information about bioethics 
activities. Each issue includes a feature 
article, a Calendar of upcoming 
events, and a case presentation and 
commentary by local experts in 
bioethics, law, medicine, nursing, or 
related disciplines. 
Diane E. Hoﬀ mann, JD, MS - Editor
for a particular patient. However, 
keeping stewardship and resource 
allocation out of the discussion 
about decision-making sometimes 
violates logical reasoning, which 
can create confusion.  For example, 
the motivation to justify withdrawal 
or withholding of life support as 
fulﬁ lling a duty of nonmaleﬁ cence 
(i.e., not harming a dying patient by 
continuing “aggressive” life support 
or attempting cardio-pulmonary 
resuscitation) is disingenuous if 
the patient does not have suﬃ  cient 
cognitive capacity to experience 
harm (i.e., “to suﬀ er”). Is this 
phenomenon unique to the United
ETHICS COMMITTEES VS. COURTS – 
A ROLE FOR REGIONAL ETHICS 
COMMITTEES IN ADDRESSING 
DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE?
Clinicians, hospital ethics committee 
members, and ethics consultants 
generally embrace the aphorism: 
“we must not ration at the bedside.” 
Justiﬁ cations for withholding or 
withdrawing interventions that 
prolong the life of a patient who 
is not expected to survive hospital 
discharge are generally grounded 
in an autonomy-preserving or a 
beneﬁ t-burden analysis rather than 
a resource allocation argument. One 
reason for this is to avoid concerns 
about conﬂ ict of interest, that is, 
that ﬁ nancial gain to the institution 
or its staﬀ  inﬂ uenced the medical 
decisions or recommendations made 
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States (US), where - outside the 
Veterans Aﬀ airs system—the 
health care system operates on 
principles of market competition 
rather than government planning? 
The case of Charlie Gard allows 
for comparison, as Charlie was 
born in the United Kingdom (UK) 
and his health care was provided 
through the UK’s National Health 
Service (NHS). Charlie’s case 
gained international recognition 
after referral to the Family Divi-
sion of UK’s High Court, where 
after numerous appeals, justices 
ultimately sided with doctors who 
opined that Charlie’s condition (a 
rare form of mitochondrial DNA 
depletion syndrome, or “MDS”) 
was incompatible with life. They 
determined it was not in his best 
interest to receive further treat-
ment and recommended that he be 
removed from life support while 
receiving palliative care. Charlie’s 
parents wanted to take him to the 
US to try experimental treatment 
with an oral drug thought to re-
place what Charlie’s body couldn’t 
produce. Potential ﬁ nancial con-
ﬂ ict of interest was not at issue 
here because neither the hospital 
nor the staﬀ  stood to gain ﬁ nan-
cially based on what happened to 
Charlie. Also, money had been 
raised through a GoFundMe cam-
paign to cover the costs of travel 
and the experimental treatment, so 
there would be no cost to the NHS 
(although the hospital was will-
ing to implement the experimental 
study protocol if they thought it 
might have beneﬁ tted Charlie). 
Presumably, the justices’ decision 
had nothing to do with the costs of 
Charlie’s care.
Here, the UK has an advantage 
over the US in that individuals 
there are on more equal footing 
regarding access to health care 
services. Resource stewardship 
and fair resource allocation are 
integral components of the NHS, 
so endorsement of these ideals by 
health care providers and those 
they serve generally engenders 
broader public support. However, 
the issue of distributive justice was 
omitted from the court’s opinion. 
Still, some weighing in on social 
media were critical of the clini-
cians’ and justices’ motivations 
in “depriving” Charlie of “hope 
for a cure.” Interestingly, the US 
researchers oﬀ ering to provide the 
experimental therapy to Charlie 
were not subjected to the same 
level of distrust, despite standing 
to gain ﬁ nancially if Charlie had 
been allowed to receive the ex-
perimental treatment they oﬀ ered. 
Hammond-Browning reported:
…[I]t became apparent that two 
potential imperatives drive access 
to treatment, the ﬁ rst being the 
best interests and the other, the 
“experimental”/“ﬁ nancial.” The 
willingness of the U.S. doctor to 
provide this experimental therapy 
raises ethical questions of provid-
ing a treatment purely based on 
the availability of funding. At some 
point Charlie’s parents were al-
lowed to believe that if they could 
simply raise the money to travel 
to the United States then their son 
would have hope, whereas the 
willingness to provide an untested 
therapy on the sole basis of rais-
ing the required money should 
have raised warning ﬂ ags and 
prompted further questions around 
anticipated outcomes. (Hammond-
Browning, 2017, p. 467) 
Potential ﬁ nancial conﬂ icts such 
as these and distributive justice is-
sues such as Charlie occupying an 
Mid-Atlantic Ethics Committee Newsletter  3
ICU bed that could beneﬁ t another 
patient were not part of the debate. 
Yet, Close and colleagues (2018) 
believe that best interest deci-
sions are inherently value-laden, 
and there is danger in prioritiz-
ing one set of values (e.g., that it 
is not in a child’s best interest to 
be maintained on life support in 
the face of impending death) over 
others (e.g., that life is of value 
regardless of a child’s prognosis). 
Instead of distancing such cases 
from discussion of fair distribu-
tion of health care resources, they 
recommend that “[m]ore treat-
ment limitation decisions could 
be based on rationing, and there 
would be less need to cloak ration-
ing decisions as best interests 
ones.” They propose quasi-judicial 
multi-member tribunals (as is done 
in other countries such as Aus-
tralia) as alternatives to courts in 
resolving conﬂ icts such as what 
treatments Charlie’s parents could 
pursue for him. 
Huxtable (2018) sees promise in 
UK’s Clinical Ethics Network 
(UKCEN) and regional clinical 
ethics committees, as they are 
quicker to issue their advice, less 
costly, more inclusive, and less ad-
versarial. Such committees could 
perhaps do a better job than the 
courts in acknowledging justice 
concerns while examining relevant 
facts and stakeholder perspectives. 
Huxtable acknowledges, however, 
that there is room for improve-
ment. Such committees should see 
their role as not just supporting 
clinicians but also the public. They 
would need to be independent 
from the health care institution(s) 
where they work, and more trans-
parent about their operating proce-
dures, how members are selected 
and trained to ensure diversity and 
competency, and how their ser-
vices are evaluated and overseen. 
Pope (2016) has studied “outlier” 
cases and how they are handled 
with regard to “futility” disputes. 
He has long been an advocate of 
regional ethics committees as a 
compromise between the trans-
parency/due process advantage 
of courts and the eﬃ  ciency of 
hospital ethics committees in 
resolving disagreements between 
family members and clinicians 
about when to withdraw non-
beneﬁ cial medical interventions. 
He argues that such committees 
would provide an advantage over 
hospital ethics committees and 
courts, as long as they were prop-
erly composed (e.g., adequate 
representation from the com-
munity and marginalized groups) 
and thoughtful attention was paid 
to procedural standards, transpar-
ency, and oversight. 
Could a diﬀ erent approach to 
resolving the conﬂ ict between 
Charlie’s parents and the medical 
team have involved less stake-
holder burden while preserving a 
fair conﬂ ict resolution process? 
It’s reported that ethics consul-
tants met with Charlie’s parents, 
yet the case still went to court. 
The court proceedings took sev-
eral months, and inﬂ icted stress, 
privacy violations, and cost bur-
dens on the parties. Mr. Justice 
Francis, the High Court judge 
overseeing Charlie’s court case, 
commented on the beneﬁ ts of 
attempting alternative means of 
dispute resolution in these kinds 
of cases. He stated:
…[I]t is my clear view that me-
diation should be attempted in 
all cases such as this one even if 
all that it does is achieve a greater 
understanding by the parties of 
each other’s positions. Few us-
ers of the court system will be 
in a greater state of turmoil and 
grief than parents in the position 
that these parents have been in 
and anything which helps them to 
understand the process and the 
viewpoint of the other side, even if 
they profoundly disagree with it, 
would in my judgment be of beneﬁ t 
and I hope that some lessons can 
therefore be taken from this tragic 
case which it has been my duty to 
oversee. (Public Law Today, 2017)
Indeed, there is tension between 
the eﬃ  ciency provided by mem-
bers of an institutional ethics com-
mittee mediating conﬂ icts in such 
cases and the neutrality, transpar-
ency, and due process of a court. If 
the conﬂ ict is primarily grounded 
in stakeholder miscommunica-
tion, it makes sense to attempt 
to address the miscommunica-
tion before turning to the court. 
But many cases that go to court 
(whether in the US or the UK) are 
“outlier” cases, such as Charlie 
Gard or Jahi McMath. If the ques-
tion at issue is whether a patient’s 
or surrogate’s demand for limited 
resources is reasonable, such as 
access to advanced life support, a 
court is not best situated to address 
this, and an institutional ethics 
committee faces the challenge of 
overcoming assertions of ﬁ nancial 
bias. Regional ethics committees 
could present a preferable conﬂ ict 
resolution process for such outlier 
cases.
In the end, some of the same chal-
lenges facing institutional ethics 
committees would be present in 
regional ethics committees: deter
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mining who is competent to join, 
training and engaging members
who are not compensated for 
their services, attracting a diverse 
membership (particularly commu-
nity members, as well as medical 
specialists), and implementing fair 
and eﬃ  cient procedural standards 
and oversight. But perhaps such a 
committee could achieve “econo-
mies of scale” by helping individ-
ual institutions achieve, collective-
ly, what is much more diﬃ  cult to 
achieve individually: contribution 
toward a fair process for handling 
conﬂ icts about medical treatment 
rooted in a community standard of 
medical care. This could be par-
ticularly useful when stewardship 
of healthcare resources (such as an 
ICU bed or advanced life support 
technology) is at issue—even if 
that is not the central issue.
Anita J. Tarzian, PhD, RN
MHECN Program Coordinator
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DIFFERENCES BETWEEN HOW US AND 
UK COURTS RESOLVE CASES
INVOLVING LIFE SUSTAINING  
TREATMENT
In “Ethics Committees vs. Courts 
– A Role for Regional Eth-
ics Committees in Addressing 
Distributive Justice?,” Dr. Tar-
zian refers to the case of Charlie 
Gard, the case that captured the 
attention of the UK and many 
in the US during the summer of 
2017. The case was perplexing 
for many American bioethicists 
and health lawyers likely because 
of some basic diﬀ erences in the 
foundational law that undergirds 
similar cases in the US.  For de-
cision-making involving infants 
and children, both courts in the 
US and UK apply a best interest 
test, as an infant or young child 
innately lacks decision-making 
capacity. However, UK and US 
law diﬀ er in who determines 
what is in the child’s best interest. 
In the US, the US Supreme Court 
has determined that parents have 
a constitutional right to privacy 
regarding family matters. This 
has been interpreted to mean that 
they have protection from govern-
ment intrusion into their decision-
making regarding health care for 
their children, absent a showing 
of abuse or neglect or statutes 
allowing a mature or emancipated 
minor to make certain decisions 
regarding their health. When 
parents disagree about a medical 
decision regarding their child, and 
the case goes to court in the US, 
the court will determine what is 
in the child’s best interest. This 
assessment generally includes the 
beneﬁ ts and burdens of life with 
and without the treatment at issue. 
In the UK, parents have no right 
to decide, but scholars have de-
scribed the decision-making over 
life-sustaining treatment in these 
cases as a ‘joint decision’ between 
the child’s parents and his or her 
doctors (Close et al., 2018). When 
the child’s physicians and parents 
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are unable to agree, the parents or 
the hospital can apply to the courts 
for a decision as to whether it is in 
the child’s best interests to provide 
life-sustaining therapy (Id.). In this 
decision, the parents’ wishes are 
“wholly irrelevant” to the objec-
tive best interest test except to the 
extent they play into the “quality 
and value to the child of the child-
parent relationship” (Mason & 
Laurie, 2013, p. 515).
Law between the jurisdictions 
also diﬀ ers in decision-making for 
adults who lack decision-making 
capacity. In the US, virtually all 
states have adopted law through 
statute or case law that allows 
surrogate decision-making for an 
adult patient who lacks decision-
making capacity. Surrogates can 
make decisions based ﬁ rst on what 
they believe the patient would 
have wanted, i.e., the substituted 
judgment test. If there is insuﬃ  -
cient evidence of what the patient 
wanted, then the surrogate is to 
base his or her decision on what 
is in the patient’s “best interest.” 
Best interest in most states is 
deﬁ ned by common law, although 
in Maryland it is spelled out in 
the Health Care Decisions Act 
(HCDA). Interestingly, in the UK, 
the courts have not adopted a sub-
stituted judgment test, rather under 
the Mental Capacity Act 2005, 
at least in England and Wales, 
the courts apply a modiﬁ ed best 
interests test that takes into ac-
count some of the attributes of the 
patient that might have aﬀ ected 
his or her decision, i.e., the pa-
tient’s previous wishes, beliefs and 
values. (This is actually similar to 
the deﬁ nition of best interests in 
the HCDA.) Also, under the law 
in the UK, the decision-maker is 
not necessarily the patient’s family 
member but is the “carer respon-
sible for [their] day-to-day care, 
or a professional such as a doc-
tor, nurse or social worker where 
decisions about treatment, care 
arrangements or accommodation 
need to be made.” (Mental Capac-
ity Act 2005).
In both the UK and the US, the 
courts in these types of decisions 
do not generally consider the cost 
of continued life-sustaining treat-
ment or use of limited medical 
resources for a patient. In the US, 
such decisions are thought not 
to be appropriate for the courts 
as they do not have the requisite 
knowledge about how health care 
resources are being used, they 
only have information about the 
case before them.  This type of 
decision, most courts argue, is 
more appropriate for a legislative 
body that can collect the informa-
tion necessary to make broader 
resource allocation decisions.  The 
issue is a separation of powers 
argument about the relative ex-
pertise and role of each branch of 
government.
As the UK does not have a consti-
tution and has no formal separa-
tion of powers doctrine, the argu-
ment does not apply to the same 
extent, but “courts usually refuse 
to intervene in resource allocation 
decisions, because they recognize 
they are poorly situated to make 
these prioritization decisions in 
the context of a single case” (Id.).  
While UK courts do not generally 
weigh in on the substantive issue 
of resource allocation, they will 
assess the decision-making pro-
cess used by a health care institu-
tion to ensure that it is fair. Most 
of the resource allocation ques-
tions come to courts in the UK 
when a patient or parent alleges 
that a health authority or institu-
tion has not allocated suﬃ  cient 
resources to a patient or family 
member.  However, even in these 
cases, there must be an explicit 
rationing decision made by the 
health authority that the court is 
asked to review. There is nothing 
comparable in the US as there is 
no right to medical care, except a 
limited right to emergency medical 
treatment under the federal Emer-
gency Medical Treatment and 
Labor Act. The closest analogy in 
the US might be appeals of Medi-
care or Medicaid coverage denial 
decisions in the context of health 
care or the appeal of a school sys-
tem decision under the Individuals 
with Disabilities Education Act 
(IDEA), denying a student a free 
and appropriate education, in the 
context of education.
Upon reading about the Charlie 
Gard case last summer, individuals 
familiar with the law regarding 
medical decision-making in the
US might have asked, why did the
Gard case go to court? In the US, 
the parents could have simply
enrolled their child in a research 
protocol without judicial approval. 
But maybe not. British health law 
experts explain that the case came 
to court at the request of the health 
care institution. The court was 
asked to aﬃ  rm the medical deci-
sion that it was not in Charlie’s 
best interest to be kept alive on the 
ventilator but also whether it was 
appropriate for Charlie to undergo 
experimental therapy. 
As to the ventilatory support and 
experimental therapy, Justice 
Francis, who heard the case, deter-
mined that there was virtually no
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beneﬁ t to either and that there 
was the potential for pain and 
suﬀ ering by exposing Charlie to 
the experimental therapy. There-
fore, he determined that neither 
were in Charlie’s best interest and 
that the hospital would be acting 
within the law to remove Charlie 
from the ventilator. In the US, it 
is conceivable that if Charlie was 
being cared for in a hospital and 
the physicians were aware that 
his parents were enrolling him 
in an experimental protocol that 
involved more than minimal risk, 
they might have taken the case to 
court arguing that such action was 
medical abuse, but such an argu-
ment would be much more dif-
ﬁ cult to make than whether or not 
the action was in the child’s best 
interest. 
Diane Hoﬀ mann, JD, MS
Jacob A. France Professor of Health Law
Director, L&HCP
University of Maryland School of Law
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HARVARD REVISITS 
CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING DEATH
This year marks the 50-year anniversary of Harvard’s ad hoc commit-
tee report establishing neurologic criteria for death (what lead author 
Henry Beecher termed “irreversible coma”). The report, published 
in 1968, informed the model deﬁ nition of death that the President’s 
Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Bio-
medical and Behavioral Research developed in 1981 to address the 
problem of variation in how states deﬁ ned death. This led to adoption 
by all states (in some form) of the Uniform Determination of Death 
Act (UDDA), which deﬁ nes death as occurring after “irreversible 
cessation of circulatory or respiratory functions” or “irreversible ces-
sation of all functions of the entire brain, including the brainstem” 
(UDDA, 2008).
Last April, Harvard convened experts to revisit criteria for determin-
ing death. Recent cases such as that of Jahi McMath have raised vari-
ous questions and concerns, as summarized below.
UDDA WORDING 
All functions of the entire brain. The UDDA speciﬁ es that death oc-
curs when “all functions of the entire brain” irreversibly stop. Since 
then, we have seen cases of people declared dead based on neurologic 
criteria whose bodies have been preserved with ventilator support and 
nutrition/hydration via gastrostomy tube. We now know that a body 
can reach a kind of homeostasis after the brain ceases to function such 
that, with ventilatory support, the lungs, heart, kidneys, and liver can 
still function, and the gut can process tube-fed nutrients. Most neu-
rologists and bioethicists have considered these bodily functions—ab-
sent a functioning brain—as insuﬃ  cient for human existence, since 
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may be reversible but since the de-
cision was previously made not to 
try to restart it, its stopping is thus 
permanent). The question of what 
deﬁ nes “permanent” circulatory 
cessation can be further nuanced 
in situations of organ donation 
after cardiac death (when an “arbi-
trary” time is established after the 
heart stops to declare death before 
organs are procured), and when 
patients are on cardiac bypass, 
such as extracorporeal membrane 
oxygenation (ECMO). ECMO-
CPR, implemented in some locales 
such as France, is highlighting the 
complexity of establishing a spe-
ciﬁ c time of death. Seema Shah, 
Associate Professor in the Divi-
sion of Bioethics at the University 
of Washington School of Medi-
cine, proposes that the UDDA’s 
deﬁ nition of death be considered 
as a “legal ﬁ ction,” much like 
blindness (i.e., one doesn’t have to 
be completely blind to be consid-
ered “legally blind”). 
CONFIRMING DEATH BY 
NEUROLOGIC CRITERIA 
Which tests are conﬁ rmatory? 
The UDDA establishes neurologic 
criteria for death as requiring the 
following over a 24-hour period, 
absent certain medications or 
conditions that could confound the 
testing:
        • No response to stimuli
        • No spontaneous movement
            or breathing
        • No reﬂ exes
However, the UDDA does not 
specify which tests must be done. 
It defers to “accepted medical 
standards” for conﬁ rming these 
criteria are met. A neurologic 
exam involves checking for absent 
the brain is the integrating center 
and without it, a human cannot 
meaningfully exist in this world. 
However, the fact that McMath 
reportedly began menstruating 
after being declared brain dead has 
led others to conclude that part of 
her hypothalamus, which supports 
pituitary function, may have been 
functioning. If this were scientiﬁ -
cally corroborated, then McMath 
would not have met the UDDA 
criteria for death, which requires 
that “all functions of the entire 
brain” have irreversibly ceased. 
Some have advocated for chang-
ing the wording in the UDDA to 
specify which functions of the 
brain must have permanently 
stopped, and to clarify which 
diagnostic tests would conﬁ rm 
this. Lawyer and futility blogger 
Thaddeus Pope predicts that more 
cases like these will challenge the 
discrepancies between the UD-
DA’s standard and the American 
Academy of Neurology (AAN) 
criteria. 
Irreversible cessation of circula-
tory function. Given advances 
in cardiopulmonary resuscita-
tion (CPR) since Harvard’s 1968 
report, it’s not surprising that 
the UDDA may be outdated in 
its language. Some have argued 
that the term “irreversible” be 
replaced with “permanent” when 
referencing circulatory function, 
since some individuals who die by 
circulatory death could have their 
heart beat and circulation restarted 
but have opted for a “Do-Not-
Attempt Resuscitation” (DNAR) 
order. In this case, circulatory 
function is permanently ceased be-
cause the DNAR order precludes 
attempts to restart the heart (that 
is, the stopping of the heart
reﬂ exes and conﬁ rming that no 
spontaneous respirations have 
occurred over a period of time 
(typically, ten minutes). Other 
ancillary tests may be done if 
needed (e.g., an electroencepha-
logram or cerebral angiogram). 
Some wonder whether other tests 
should be considered or developed 
that would reduce ambiguity or 
uncertainty, such as giving intra-
venous atropine to see if heart rate 
increases, or more precise types of 
blood ﬂ ow studies.
Variable practices. Many point out 
that clinical practice varies from 
state to state and institution to 
institution. Greer and colleagues 
(2008) found major diﬀ erences in 
brain death guidelines among the 
leading neurologic hospitals in the 
US, concluding that adherence to 
the AAN guidelines for determin-
ing death by neurologic criteria 
is inconsistent. Some wonder if 
having diﬀ erent guidelines for 
adults and children may add to the 
variable approaches. The AAN’s 
guidelines for adults can be found 
at https://www.aan.com/Guide-
lines/home/GuidelineDetail/431. 
The Pediatric Section of the Soci-
ety of Critical Care Medicine’s (P-
SCCM’s) guidelines for children 
and infants are available at https://
www.aap.org/en-us/Documents/
socc_pediatric_bd_guideline_tool.
pdf. 
Consent & refusal for apnea 
testing. Some clinicians, such as 
neurologist Alan Shewmon, have 
concluded that apnea testing to 
conﬁ rm neurologic death is un-
ethical, as it may harm patients 
who retain some brain function. 
Others believe that clinicians 
should get consent to perform the 
apnea test. There is a small but 
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growing number of cases in which 
surrogates have refused to allow 
clinicians to perform an apnea test, 
thus precluding the declaration of 
death via neurologic criteria (since 
the apnea test is typically the 
last step before death is declared 
via neurologic criteria). Nevada 
recently passed a bill recognizing 
that the determination of death is a 
clinical decision made by a doc-
tor in accordance with AAN’s and 
P-SCCM’s guidelines, and that 
surrogate consent is not required. 
However—Shewmon’s position 
notwithstanding—others have 
suggested that physicians explain 
implications of the apnea test by 
providing a kind of “informed 
non-dissent” with the surrogate 
such that objectors could decline. 
In those cases, death would not be 
declared, but presumably, it would 
come eventually, for example, 
after a determination that further 
treatment was non-beneﬁ cial, 
since the patient could not survive 
outside of the intensive care unit.
 
In 1968, Henry Beecher referred to 
brain death as “irreversible coma.” 
Indeed, some believe those with 
higher brain function loss, such as 
Terri Schiavo, could be considered 
dead. Robert Veatch suggested that 
individuals be able to declare in 
an advance directive whether they 
considered themselves dead based 
on permanent whole brain, higher 
brain, or circulatory function loss. 
This would allow for organs to be 
procured in a way that respects 
individual variation in when they 
consider a person dead. In 2018, 
Robert Truog, Director of the 
Harvard Center for Bioethics, 
referred to Jahi McMath as being 
in a state of “irreversible apneic 
unconsciousness,” which evokes 
Beecher’s reference. Truog chal-
lenged the mainstream consensus 
that the UDDA’s deﬁ nition of 
death is “good enough.” Time will 
tell whether we stick with the sta-
tus quo and if not, what changes 
are on the horizon.
Anita J. Tarzian, PhD, RN
MHECN Program Coordinator
REFERENCES
Greer, D.M., Varelas, P.N., Haque, 
S. & Wijdicks, E.F. (2007). Vari-
ability of brain death determina-
tion guidelines in leading US 
neurologic institutions. Neurology, 
70(4), 284-9.
Uniform Law Commission 
(2008). Uniform Determina-
tion of Death Act, 12A uniform 
laws annotated 777. Available at: 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.
aspx?title=Determination%20
of%20Death%20Act.
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MHECN ESTABLISHES ADVISORY BOARD
On July 2, 2018, MHECN staﬀ  
held a roundtable on the future of 
the Network to which they invited 
twenty ethics committee represen-
tatives and thought leaders in the 
areas of bioethics, health policy 
and bioethics-related legal is-
sues. At the roundtable, attendees 
explored the following questions: 
1) is the Network continuing to 
provide members with valuable 
information and services; and 2) 
are there other types of initiatives 
or services that the Network could 
provide that would assist members 
in addressing ethical issues that 
arise in their institutions. Par-
ticipants heard presentations from 
Diane Hoﬀ mann, who convened 
the meeting, about the history of 
the Network and activities and 
initiatives it has undertaken rang-
ing from delivering educational 
programs and providing informa-
tion (e.g., The Mid-Atlantic Ethics 
Committee Newsletter to engaging 
in research on such issues as the 
competency of ethics committee 
members, the views of ICU physi-
cians and hospital legal counsel on 
the medically ineﬀ ective treatment 
provisions in the Health Care De-
cisions Act; and the implementa
tion of the Maryland Orders
for Life Sustaining Procedures 
Act. They also heard from Anita 
Tarzian, Coordinator of the Net-
work, about what is happening 
at the national level with ethics 
committees, in particular ef-
forts by the American Society of 
Bioethics in Healthcare (ASBH) 
to establish standards for clini-
cal ethics consultation, and from 
Paul Ballard of the Maryland 
Oﬃ  ce of the Attorney General, 
about initiatives of the State Ad-
visory Council on Quality Care at 
the End of Life. These presenta-
tions were followed by comments 
from Cynda Rushton, Professor 
of Clinical Ethics, at the Berman 
Institute of Bioethics and School 
of Nursing at Johns Hopkins 
University; David Moller, Direc-
tor of Health Care Ethics, Anne 
Arundel Medical Center; and 
Evan DeRenzo, Assistant Direc-
tor, John J. Lynch, MD Center 
for Ethics, MedStar Washington 
Hospital Center. Each spoke 
about some of the programs and 
issues their committee had taken 
on or were struggling with. The 
remainder of the roundtable was 
spent hearing from each of the 
attendees regarding their thoughts 
about the future of the Network. 
An outgrowth of the roundtable 
was the establishment of an 
Advisory Board for the Network 
to keep it current and make 
sure that it is providing a useful 
forum and services to its mem-
ber institutions. Members of the 
Board include: Cynda Rushton 
(Johns Hopkins Hospital), Evan 
DeRenzo (MedStar Washing-
ton Hospital Center), David 
Moller (Anne Arundel Medical 
Center), Frederick Weinstein, 
Yoram Unguru (Sinai Hospital), 
Jack Schwartz (formerly with 
Maryland Oﬃ  ce of the Attorney 
General), Jessica Schram (Living 
Legacy Foundation), Lee Schwab 
(Holy Cross Hospital), Wayne 
Brannock (Lorien Health Servic-
es), Marion Danis (NIH), Karen 
Rothenberg (University of Mary-
land School of Law), Shahid Aziz 
(formerly with Harbor Hospital), 
Dan Kleiner (Kennedy Kreiger), 
Jackie Dinterman (Frederick 
Regional Health Systems), and 
Henry Silverman (University of 
Maryland Medical Center). The 
ﬁ rst meeting of the Advisory 
Board was on October 1, 2018.
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ASBH OFFERS FIRST CERTIFICATION EXAM FOR 
ETHICS CONSULTANTS
On June 10, 2018, the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities (ASBH) opened its application cycle 
for certiﬁ cation to practice clinical healthcare ethics consulting. Those who demonstrate the requisite practice 
experience and pass the certiﬁ cation exam will earn the HEC-C credential. The HEC-C program assesses core 
knowledge and skills in clinical healthcare ethics consulting. Eligible applicants are those who have a Bach-
elor’s Degree (minimum) and at least 400 hours of healthcare ethics experience within the previous four years. 
The exam is administered during two, month-long test windows between November 1-30, 2018, and May 1-31, 
2019. The application deadline date for the November testing window was September 10, and the application 
deadline date for the May testing window is March 10. The exam fee is $450 for ASBH members and $650 for 
non-members. To view the content outline for the exam with examples and to download an application, visit 
http://www.asbh.org.
CORE REFERENCES FOR THE HCE-C EXAM
Applebaum, P. S. (2007). Clinical practice.  Assessment of patients’ competence to  consent  to  treatment. New 
England Journal of Medicine, 357(18), 1834-1840.
Beauchamp, T., & Childress, J. (2012). Principles of Biomedical Ethics (7th ed.). Oxford, UK: Oxford Univer-
sity Press. 
Berlinger, N., Jennings,  B., & Wolf,  S.  (2013). The Hastings Center Guidelines for Decisions on Life-Sustain-
ing Treatment and Care Near the End of Life. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Core Competencies Task Force (2011). Core Competencies for Healthcare Ethics Consultation (2nd ed.). 
Chicago, IL: American Society of Bioethics and Humanities. 
Clinical Ethics Consultation Aﬀ airs Committee. (2017). Addressing Patient-Centered Ethical Issues in Health 
Care: A Case-Based Study Guide. Chicago, IL: American Society of Bioethics and Humanities.
Clinical Ethics Consultation Aﬀ airs Committee. (2015). Improving Competencies in Clinical Ethics Consulta-
tion: An Education Guide (2nd ed.) Chicago, IL: American Society of Bioethics and Humanities.
Diekema, D., Mercurio, M., & Adam M (Eds). (2011). Clinical Ethics in Pediatrics: A Case-Based Textbook. 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Dubler, N., & Liebman, C. (2011). Bioethics Mediation: A Guide to Shaping Shared Solutions.Nashville, TN.: 
Vanderbilt University Press.
Fletcher, J., Lombardo, P., & Spencer, E. (2005). Fletcher's Introduction to Clinical Ethics (3rd ed.). Hager-
stown, MD: University Publishing Group.
Ford, P. & Dudzinski, D. (Eds.). (2008). Complex Ethics Consultations: Cases That Haunt Us. Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press.
Hester, D.N. & Schonfeld, T. (2012). Guidance for Healthcare Ethics Committees. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press.
Jonsen, A., Siegler, M., & Winslade, W. (2015). Clinical Ethics: A Practical Approach to Ethical Decisions in 
Clinical Medicine (8th ed.). New York: McGraw Hill.
Kon AA, Shepard, E. K., Sederstrom, N. O., Swoboda, S. M., Marshall, M. F., Birriel, B., & Rincon, F. (2016). 
Deﬁ ning futile and potentially inappropriate interventions: A policy statement from the Society of Critical Care 
Medicine Ethics Committee. Critical Care Medicine, 44(9), 1769-1774.
Lo, B. (2013). Resolving Ethical Dilemmas: A Guide for Clinicians (5th ed.). Philadelphia: Lippincott Williams 
& Wilkins.
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CASE PRESENTATION
One of the regular features of this Newsletter is the presentation of a case considered by an ethics committee and an 
analysis of the ethical issues involved. Readers are both encouraged to comment on the case or analysis and to submit 
other cases that their ethics committee has dealt with. In all cases, identifying information about patients and others in the 
case should only be provided with the permission of the patient. Unless otherwise indicated, our policy is not to identify 
the submitter or institution. We may also change facts to protect conﬁ dentiality. Cases and comments should be sent to 
MHECN@law.umaryland.edu, or MHECN, Law & Health Care Program, University of Maryland Francis King Carey 
School of Law, 500 W. Baltimore St., Baltimore, MD 21201.
CASE STUDY: When 
Physicians Lose Their 
Tempers: Apologizing and 
Moving Forward in the 
Care of a Dying Patient
The following case and ﬁ rst 
commentary are reprinted with 
permission from the Journal of 
Hospital Ethics, 2015, Volume 4, 
Issue 1, 33-34.
Mrs. C. is a 76-year-old woman 
brought to the hospital’s Emer-
gency Department (ED) after 
a sudden, unwitnessed cardiac 
arrest. EMS was called after 
she was found by her neighbors 
and they were unclear as to how 
long she had been down. Mrs. 
C. received extensive cardio-
pulmonary resuscitation lasting 
over 40 minutes in the ED before 
establishing a stable cardiac 
rhythm suﬃ  cient for transfer to 
the cardiac intensive care unit 
(CICU). 
After her admission to the CICU, 
the neurology team assessed the 
patient, concluding that she had 
suﬀ ered signiﬁ cant and likely 
irreversible neurological dam-
age caused by her cardiac arrest. 
Both neurology and the CICU 
teams have determined that the 
patient has very little chance 
at any meaningful neurologic 
recovery and that her general 
prognosis is poor. Mrs. C. has 4 
adult children and a very involved 
son-in-law, but does not have an 
Advance Directive of any kind. Her 
family and the CICU team have 
been meeting regularly to discuss 
her circumstances and determine 
appropriate goals of care. These 
discussions have gone on for more 
than a week. The CICU attending 
physician has explained at
each meeting that the patient’s 
neurological condition has not 
changed, that she is hemodynami-
cally stable, and so it will be up to 
the children whether or not they 
want the patient to receive a trache-
ostomy and percutaneous endo-
scopic gastrostomy (trach and peg) 
and be moved to a nursing home, 
or whether they want to shift to 
comfort measures only.
As the patient’s care moves into 
the second week, Dr. W., the CICU 
attending physician who has been 
present at several of the previ-
ous family meetings, has grown 
increasingly frustrated as a result 
of the children’s inability to de-
cide what direction they want to 
take with their mother. It has been 
Dr. W.’s training that he is to lay 
out the options and let the family 
decide. But he has grown frustrated 
with their indecision and walks 
out of the next meeting throwing 
his hands in the air, declaring, “I 
don’t care what they want, as long 
as they make a decision!” Both 
family and medical team members 
who witnessed the display are left 
in various degrees of shock, confu-
sion, and anger. Ethics is consulted 
in order to address the resulting 
tensions and distress.
CHART NOTE AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Dr. W. and the clinical ethicist 
should meet with the family so that 
Dr. W. can oﬀ er an apology 
for his frustration.
2. Dr. W. should make a clear rec-
ommendation about what he thinks 
would be best for Mrs. C. and why 
he thinks this would be the best ap-
proach to her future care.
REASONING
The attending physician has dem-
onstrated an impulsive lack of 
appropriate professional demeanor 
and regard for the sensitive nature 
of the matters under discussion. 
His voiced frustration has resulted 
in additional distress to the family 
and the rest of the clinical team. 
After calming down and reﬂ ecting, 
Dr. W. tells the ethics consultant he 
regrets having blown up. He tells 
the consultant that his frustration 
comes not only from the family’s 
indecision, but from the way in 
which he feels he has been trained 
and professionally conditioned to 
refrain in such circumstances from 
oﬀ ering his own recommendation; 
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that he’s just to lay out the options 
and let the family choose (Hutchin-
son & Veatch, 2015).
Frustration is no excuse when an 
emotional reaction gets the better 
of a clinician’s behavior. When this 
happens, however, clinicians need 
to acknowledge that they’ve lost 
their temper and be sure to genu-
inely apologize. We’ve learned that 
a sincerely felt and given apology 
from a physician for a medical er-
ror goes a long way to reduce the 
distress physician mistakes cause to 
patients and families (Robbennolt, 
2009).
There is no reason to think that 
an honest apology for losing 
one’s temper can’t have the same 
beneﬁ cial eﬀ ects. One particular 
potential outcome, the building 
of trust, is particularly important 
here. Combining renewed trust and 
having the physician give a clear 
recommendation may help move 
the family forward. Separating Dr. 
W.’s frustrated outburst from the 
content of his remarks indicates 
that he has come to these meet-
ings with an appropriate impartial-
ity towards the outcome. When a 
patient is unstable and imminently 
dying, physicians should only oﬀ er 
indicated interventions. If patients 
or families ask for interventions 
that are not indicated on the ba-
sis of well-established standards 
of practice, ordinarily physicians 
should not provide such interven-
tions (Bosslet, et al., 2015).
Where conﬂ icts continue, transfer 
should be facilitated to the great-
est degree medically feasible. But 
where a hospitalized patient, even 
a dying hospitalized patient, can be 
made stable to discharge, Dr. W.  
appears to be rightly coming to
the decision-making from a posi-
tion impartial towards the outcome. 
That does not mean, however, 
that a physician ought not give a 
recommendation. Although this is 
a controversial point, we take the 
position that after presenting all 
medical options within reason, it 
remains the physician’s responsi-
bility to make a recommendation. 
Often this can help a family come 
to their own decision, whether in 
agreement with the physician or 
not. If, under these conditions, the 
family cannot come to a decision, 
it is incumbent on the physician to 
move to sustain the patient’s life 
and ready the patient for discharge. 
If the physician and other clinicians 
can do this in a supportive rather 
than frustrated manner, whatever 
the decision, the hospital experi-
ence is likely to be less distressing 
for everyone.
The Editorial Group of the Center 
for Ethics, MedStar Washington 
Hospital Center, Washington, DC
REFERENCES
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ATS/AACN/ACCP/ESICM/SCCM 
policy statement: Responding to 
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Units. Am J Respir Crit Care Med, 
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COMMENTS FROM AN 
ETHICS CONSULTANT
Some form of communication 
breakdown is present in most ethics 
case consultations. This case was 
prompted by an unfortunate inci-
dent in which the CICU attending 
physician failed to navigate the pa-
tient’s care in a way that conveyed 
compassion and a clear direction 
to stakeholders. Ethics consultants 
are likely familiar with scenarios 
in which the medical team reports 
having repeatedly attempted to 
achieve consensus with family 
members on appropriate goals of 
care for an incapacitated patient but 
have been unsuccessful in achiev-
ing such consensus. Sometimes, 
best eﬀ orts were implemented to 
no avail. Often, however, the qual-
ity of the communication preceding 
the request for ethics consultation 
has been deﬁ cient. In this case, 
Dr. W.’s outburst is indicative of 
a clear breach in communication 
standards. How should the re-
sponding ethics consultant (or con-
sultants – the plural “consultant” is 
used here for simplicity) respond to 
this breach of professional ethics?
The obvious step of gathering 
relevant facts in this case may be 
additionally challenged by the 
breakdown in trust (and perhaps 
medical team rapport) that resulted 
from Dr. W.’s inappropriate behav-
ior. Wicks and Buck (2013) point 
out the importance of health care 
leaders modeling best practices for 
cultivating resilience, which they 
refer to as more than “bouncing 
back from stress” (p. 6) but “both 
recovering and deepening as a con-
sequence of encountering stress in 
the right way with adequate inner 
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Tsen, L.C. (2014). Instituting a 
culture of professionalism: the 
establishment of a center for 
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The Joint Commission Journal on 
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strength” (p. 7). They identify 
“becoming easily upset” as one red 
ﬂ ag of possible burnout. Thus, one 
role for the ethics consultant may 
be to speak privately with Dr. W. to 
understand what prompted his frus-
tration and if he has insight into his 
inability to regulate his emotional 
reaction in front of family and 
staﬀ . If this is a recurring pattern 
with this particular provider, other 
interventions may be appropriate as 
a method of follow-up.
Shapiro and colleagues (2014) 
created the Center for Professional-
ism and Peer Support at Brigham 
and Women’s Hospital in Boston to 
educate staﬀ  about professionalism 
and to manage unprofessional be-
havior. They report that mandatory 
education sessions on professional 
development successfully engaged 
clinicians in developing a culture 
of “enhanced professionalism.” In 
particular, they have developed a 
process for responding to clinicians 
exhibiting repetitive unprofessional 
behavior that demonstrates suc-
cessful outcomes in altering such 
behavior.
Whether Dr. W.’s outburst was an 
isolated incident or a pattern of 
unprofessional conduct, he should 
be steered in the right direction to 
correct his missteps. In this case, it 
would be appropriate for the ethics 
consultant to coach Dr. W. in how 
to make amends and redirect atten-
tion toward doing what’s right for 
the patient. If Dr. W. would not be 
open to such an intervention, that 
says something about the organiza-
tional culture. 
It’s not uncommon for patients or 
family members to vent frustrations 
about members of the health care 
team to ethics consultants. 
While ethics consultants can do 
their best to avoid taking sides in 
their eﬀ orts to reconstruct rele-
vant perspectives, they should not 
be put in a position of enabling or 
apologizing for another provider’s 
unprofessional conduct.
Anita J. Tarzian, PhD, RN
MHECN Program Coordinator
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OCTOBER
8-10
Aspen Ethical Leadership Program for Healthcare. Visit: http://www.aspenethicalleadership.com. 
11
A Live Online Workshop on Disclosure and Apology after Medical Errors and Adverse Events.
Visit: http://ipepweb.org/disclosure-and-apology.
16
The 3rd Annual Ethics Symposium: Conscientious Objection, sponsored by the Clinical Ethics Department at 
Children's Hospitals and Clinics of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN. Visit: www.childrensmn.org/conferences. 
16-17
Pediatric ELNEC (End-of-Life Nursing Education Consortium), sponsored by the University of Maryland 
Children’s Hospital, 110 S. Paca St., Baltimore, MD. Contact: professionaldevelopment@umm.edu; 410-328-
6257. 
17-18
ELNEC (End-of-Life Nursing Education Consortium) for Veterans, sponsored by Stella Maris, 2300 Dulaney 
Valley Rd, Timonium, MD. Visit: https://www.stellamaris.org/news/events.
18-21
The Future is Now: 20th Annual Meeting of the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities, Anaheim, 
CA. Visit: http://www.asbh.org. 
NOVEMBER
2-5
The 14th Biannual Clinical Ethics Immersion, Center for Ethics at MedStar Washington Hospital Center, 
Washington, DC. Visit: https://www.medstarwashington.org/our-hospital/center-for-ethics/clinical-ethics.
8
5th Annual Interprofessional, Interfaith Ethics Forum: Exploring Mental Health from a Trauma-Informed 
Care Lens, SMC Campus Center, University of Maryland, Baltimore, MD (Co-sponsored by MHECN – 
DISCOUNT for MHECN members).
CALENDAR OF EVENTS
Fall 2018
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RECURRING EVENTS
Johns Hopkins Berman Institute of Bioethics Seminar Series, either at Feinstone Hall, E2030, 
Bloomberg School of Public Health (615 N. Wolfe St.) or JH Technology Ventures (1812 Ashland Ave), 
Baltimore, MD. 12N-1:15PM. Visit: http://www.bioethicsinstitute.org/educationtraining-2/seminar-
series.
October 8:   “Bioethics, Pain Medicine, and America’s Opioid Crisis,” Travis Rieder, PhD, Director 
of the Master of Bioethics degree program and Research Scholar, Berman Institute of Bioethics (JH 
Technology Ventures)
October 29: “Opportunity Pluralism and Children’s Health,” Matteo Bonotti, Lecturer, Department of 
Politics and International Relations, Monash University (Feinstone)
November 12:  “Marked Men: In Case You Don’t Know About Tuskegee,” Peter Buxton (Feinstone)
November 26:   “Moral Distress: A Time for Hope?” Alisa Carse, PhD, Associate Professor of 
Philosophy, Kennedy Institute of Ethics (Feinstone)
December 10: “Incidental Enhancements: The Challenge of Prevention for Human Gene Editing 
Governance,” Eric Juengst, PhD, Director, Center for Bioethics, University of North Carolina 
(Feinstone)
The Maryland Healthcare Ethics Committee Network (MHECN) is a membership organization, established by the Law 
and Health Care Program at the University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law. The purpose of MHECN is to 
facilitate and enhance ethical reﬂ ection in all aspects of decision making in health care settings by supporting and providing 
informational and educational resources to ethics committees serving health care institutions in the state of Maryland. The 
Network attempts to achieve this goal by:
• Serving as a resource to ethics committees as they investigate ethical dilemmas within their institution and as they 
strive to assist their institution to act consistently with its mission statement;
• Fostering communication and information sharing among Network members;
• Providing educational programs for ethics committee members, other healthcare providers, and members of the 
general public on ethical issues in health care; and
• Conducting research to improve the functioning of ethics committees and ultimately the care of patients in Maryland.
MHECN appreciates the support of its individual and institutional members. MHECN also welcomes support from aﬃ  liate 
members who provide additional ﬁ nancial support.
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Maryland Health Care Ethics 
Committee Network
University of Maryland 
Francis King Carey School of Law
500 W. Baltimore Street
Baltimore, MD 21201
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E-MAIL
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     @ $35/yr.        non-member) Subscriptions 
         @ $90/yr.  (up to 20 copies)
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MHECN@law.umaryland.edu, or (410) 706-4457 or visit http://www.law.umaryland.edu/mhecn
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